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Abstract 
 
The use by farmers of futures contracts and other hedging instruments has been 
observed to be low in many situations, and this has sometimes seemed to be considered 
surprising or even mysterious. We propose that it is, in fact, readily understandable and 
consistent with rational decision making. Standard models of the decision about optimal 
hedging show that it is negatively related to basis risk, to quantity risk, and to transaction 
costs. Farmers who have less uncertainty about prices have a lower optimal level of hedging. 
If a farmer has optimistic price expectations relative to the futures market, the incentive to 
hedge can be greatly reduced. And finally, farmers who have low levels of risk aversion have 
little to gain from hedging in terms of risk reduction, in that the certainty equivalent payoff at 
their optimal hedge may be little different to the certainty equivalent under zero hedging. 
These reasons are additional to the argument of Simmons (2002) who showed that, if capital 
markets are efficient, farmers can manage their risk exposure through adjusting their 
leverage, obviating the need for hedging instruments. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Simmons (2002) asked the question “Why do farmers have so little interest in futures 
markets?” He was responding to the common observation that the use by farmers of futures 
contracts (and other hedging instruments) is less than might be expected based on a reading 
of the economics literature that deals with optimal hedging. The literature indicates that 
hedging with futures or forward contracts will benefit agricultural producers by offsetting 
their price risk (e.g., Johnson, 1960; McKinnon, 1967; Peck, 1975; Danthine, 1978; 
Holthausen, 1979; Feder et al., 1980; Anderson and Danthine, 1983; Robison and Barry, 
1987; Lapan and Moschini, 1994; Lubulwa et al., 1996). While the actual use of price 
hedging instruments varies between agricultural industries and between counties, there are 
many cases where relatively few producers use them. (e.g., Berck, 1981; Patrick et al., 1993; 
Brorsen, 1995; Collins, 1997; Hardaker et al., 1997; Simmons and Rambaldi, 1997; Carter, 
1999).  
Simmons (2002) showed that if capital markets are efficient, in the sense that there 
are negligible differences between interest rates for lending and borrowing, then farmers can 
achieve their optimal risk exposure entirely by adjusting leverage, so that the optimal hedging 
ratio is zero. Perhaps this helps to explain the low use of hedging to some extent, although the 
usual existence of differences between borrowing and lending interest rates reduces the 
power of the explanation. 
In this paper we argue that, even without Simmon’s explanation, there are several 
other factors that contribute to low use of hedging instruments by many farmers. One 
potential factor is bias in subjective price expectations, to which little attention has been paid 
in the literature. A common assumption is that each farmer’s expectations about spot prices 
correspond exactly to the relevant futures price (“unbiased” price expectations), allowing 
analyses to focus on hedging, rather than speculation. Nevertheless, Hardaker et al. (1997) 
noted that low usage of futures by farmers may be due in part to an expectation that the cash 
(or spot) price will be above the futures price when the product is sold. Conversely, if 
expectations about cash prices are below the futures price, then farmers have an increased 
incentive to use futures. Shi and Irwin (2005), building on the models of Lence and Hayes 
(1994a, 1994b) and Foster and Whiteman (2002), explored the consequences of relatively 
optimistic and pessimistic expectations about spot price. They showed that there are both   3 
speculative and hedging components to the optimal use of price risk instruments. In a 
sensitivity analysis they showed that, if farmers have high confidence in their beliefs about 
prices (a low variance of the subjective price distribution), the speculative component can be 
larger in magnitude than the hedging component.  
Other factors that have been recognized as potential contributors to low hedging ratios 
include production uncertainty (Lapan and Moschini, 1994), basis risk (Pennings and 
Meulenberg, 1997) and transaction costs associated with purchasing and selling futures 
contracts (Bond and Thompson, 1985).  
Finally, there is the question of how much benefit the farmer is able to obtain through 
price risk management. Based on the literature on the adoption of innovations, both in 
agriculture (e.g. Pannell et al., 2006; Feder and Umali, 1993) and more generally (Rogers, 
2003), we understand that, in order to adopt a new practice, farmers need to expect that it will 
deliver a “relative advantage” to them that is sufficient to outweigh the costs of learning 
about and implementing the practice. It is thus important to consider the magnitude of the 
expected gain from hedging under various circumstances.  
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of the above factors as 
potential contributors to low adoption of price hedging instruments among some groups of 
farmers. This requires a numerical analysis, which is done for a case study of wool 
production from sheep in Australia. The results obtained do not yield general conclusions, but 
provide hypotheses that can be tested in other case studies.  
In section 2 we present a standard model of hedging that incorporates all of the above 
factors. Section 3 describes the numerical case study. Section 4 presents and discusses results, 
and section 5 is a summary of conclusions. 
 
2.  The model 
 
We theoretically derive the optimal hedge ratio using a mean-variance framework. 
Symbols are listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary of model parameters. All prices apart from  0 f  relate to time 1. 
Parameters  Description 
p    Expected cash price  
sp  Standard deviation of cash price 
1 f   Expected futures price at time 1 
sf  Standard deviation of subjective distribution of futures price 
0 f   Current futures price (at time 0) 
q   Expected output 
sq  Standard deviation of subjective distribution of output 
h  Quantity hedged 
rfp  Correlation coefficient between cash price and futures price at time 1 
rpq  Correlation coefficient between cash price and output 
rfq  Correlation coefficient between futures price at time 1 and output 
t  Transaction costs 
Cv  Variable input costs 
Cf  Fixed costs 
l  Parameter of absolute risk aversion 
   4 
There are two trading dates in the model. At time 0, the farmer purchases inputs (x) to 
produce output q that will be harvested at time 1 according to the production function q = f(x, 
u), where u is a variable outside the control of the farmer. The farmer can sell the output in 
the cash market upon harvest at time 1 for a price p. In addition, the farmer can trade on the 
futures markets. If a farmer took a long position in the cash market by producing a 
commodity for future sale, and a short position in the futures market, any losses (or gains) 
resulting from changes in the spot price would be approximately offset by gains (or losses) in 
the future market . By this means, hedging can reduce the level of price risk faced.  
Let h be the quantity of output hedged at time 0, which will be settled by an offsetting 
position at time 1. Let f0 be the price of futures at time 0 (when the futures contract is 
purchased) and f1 be the price at which the futures contract can be settled at time 1. The 
farmer knows f0 with certainty, but f1 is correlated (imperfectly) with the uncertain cash price 
of the product, and so is uncertain. 
When the farmer decides on h at time 0, the farmer has a joint subjective probability 
distribution for three stochastic variables at period 1, the uncertain prices ( p ~ ,  1
~
f ) and yield 
(q ~). Let  p ,  1 f  and q represent the expected prices and yield and let ij W  be the variance-
covariance of ( p ~ ,  1
~
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The farmer’s profit at period 1 is thus a random variable defined as: 
t p h C q C f f h p q f v - - - - + = ) ~ ( )
~
( * ~ * ~
1 0   (2) 
where  ) ~ (q Cv  is the total variable cost function, Cf are fixed costs, and t are the transaction 
costs of using the futures market. Simmons (2002) has estimated that transaction costs for 
Australian farmers are approximately 2 per cent of the value of contracts. Bond and 
Thompson (1985) showed that risk attitude will affect the extent of hedging if transaction 
costs are nonlinearly related to the level of hedging, but for simplicity we assume a linear 
relationship.  
Our optimal hedging model takes into account uncertainty surrounding cash price, 
production output, variable cost of production, and the basis (i.e. the difference between the 
spot price and the nearby futures price, p – f1). That is, the risk facing producers is assumed to 
arise from price risk on the spot market with  ) , ( ~ pp p N p W , basis risk because f and p are 
not perfectly correlated, so  ) , ( ~ 1 1 ff f N f W , and production risk with  ) , ( ~ qq q N q W , which 
also results in uncertainty about variable costs, with  ) ) ( , ) ( ( ~ ) (
'
qq v v v q C q C N q C W , where 
) (q Cv  is total variable cost at the expected yield, and  ) (
' q Cv  is marginal cost.  
Assuming that the producer maximizes expected utility, the objective function is: 
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where l is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ARA). For a given level of 
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  (5) 
Equation (5) is similar to the function provided by Carter (1999), apart from the addition of 
transaction costs and risky variable costs in the current study.  
The third term in Equations (4) and (5) is the main hedging component. The lower the 
correlation between cash price and settlement price (i.e. the greater the basis risk), the lower 
is the optimal hedge. 
The second term represents the effect of production risk on the optimal hedge. If 
production is negatively correlated with price, the two risks counteract each other to some 
extent, and this reduces the optimal hedging ratio. This effect only operates if the marginal 
cost of inputs is not equal to the expected output price. In other words, the effect of output 
risk will be small unless the producer is operating at some distance from the optimal input 
level.  
The first term is the speculative component. For a non-producer (q = 0), who can only 









= . Positive speculation is encouraged if the settlement price is expected to be 
less than the current futures price (in other words, if the farmer believes that the current 
futures price is optimistic), and is discouraged by transaction costs. Note that risk aversion 
moderates the speculative component, but does not affect the hedging components, given the 
assumptions of this model. If the current futures price is an unbiased estimate of the 
settlement price and transaction costs are absent, there is no speculative component. 
The  effects  of  changing  key  parameters  are  summarized  through  the  following 
comparative static results: 














  (6) 
which, assuming that quantity and price are negatively correlated, is negative. 
Transaction cost:    0
1
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That is, as basis risk falls (i.e., as rpf rises), the optimal hedge rises. 
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3.  Numerical example 
 
A numerical case study is presented for Australian wool producers, who as a group 
make little use of hedging instruments. The purpose is to illustrate the quantitative 
importance of different influences on the optimal hedge. Parameter values (Table 2) are based 
on a study conducted in the late 1990s (Coad, 2000), which drew on many data sources, 
including a bio-economic farming model of the region, MIDAS (Kingwell and Pannell, 1987) 
and studies of risk attitudes (Bardsley and Harris, 1987; Abadi Ghadim and Pannell, 2003). 
Consistent with the model presented above, Hinchy and Fischer (1988) concluded that wool 
prices approximate a normal distribution.  
Coad (2000) elicited the subjective price expectations of a sample of wool producers. 
Figure 1 illustrates distributions for two farmers, showing that different farmers hold different 
subjective expectations about future market prices. This is further highlighted in Figure 2, 
which shows the frequency distribution of mean price expectations for a sample of 50 wool 
producers. There are remarkably large differences between producers in their price 
expectations. Clearly, many of these producers do not believe that the futures price provides a 
reliable predictor of cash prices in the future. These results were used to establish relevant 
parameter values in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Assumed parameter values in numerical case study. 
Parameters  Units  Base case  Alternative value(s) for 
sensitivity analysis 
p    c kg
-1  500   
sp  c kg
-1  30  50 
1 f   c kg
-1  500   
sf  c kg
-1  30  50 
0 f   c kg
-1  500  475 
q   kg  32000   
sq  kg  1000  0 
h   kg  Endogenous   
rfp  -  0.9  1.0 
rpq  -  -0.1  0 
rfq  -  -0.1  0 
t  c kg
-1  10  0 





Cv’(q )  c kg
-1  500  400 
Cf  $  10000   
l  -  1.0E-06  4.0E-06 
 
 



































Figure 1. Subjective probability distributions of wool price for two surveyed farmers. 


















































Figure 2. Distribution of expected wool prices for a sample of wool producers in Western 
Australia (n = 50).  
 
 
Calculations for the results that follow are available at 
http://cyllene.uwa.edu.au/~dpannell/archive/hedging.xls 
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4.  Results and discussion 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show results for optimal hedging ratio for a selection of parameter 
combinations. Table 3 illustrates the sensitivity of the optimal hedge to changes in risk 
aversion, price risk, transaction costs and the current futures price
1. Other parameters are at 
the base-case levels shown in Table 2.  
 
Each of these parameters makes a substantial difference to the optimal hedging ratio. 
Lower price risk reduces hedging through reducing its risk-related benefits. Notably, there is 
a strong interaction between price expectations and risk aversion. This is highlighted further 
in Figure 3. At the risk aversion level judged to be typical for this group of producers (1.0E-
06), the optimal hedging ratio is very sensitive indeed to differences in price expectations. A 
change in price expectations of 5 per cent is sufficient to change the optimal hedging ratio by 
almost 90 percentage points (e.g. from 90 per cent to 3 per cent in one of the cases 
illustrated). On the other hand, for producers who are highly risk averse (ARA = 4.0E-06), 
the sensitivity of hedging to price expectations is much reduced (though still important) – a 5 
percent change in price expectations changes the optimal hedging ratio by around 20 
percentage points. For farmers who are optimistic about spot prices, lower risk aversion 
reduces the optimal use of futures through enhancing the speculative component of the 
decision.  
 
Table 3. Optimal hedging ratio for various parameter combinations (other parameters at base-
case values) 
l  sf = sp  t  0 f   h* ratio 
0.000001  30  10  500  0.55 
0.000001  30  10  475  -0.32 
0.000001  30  0  500  0.90 
0.000001  30  0  475  0.032 
0.000001  50  10  500  0.78 
0.000001  50  10  475  0.46 
0.000001  50  0  500  0.90 
0.000001  50  0  475  0.59 
0.000004  30  10  500  0.81 
0.000004  30  10  475  0.60 
0.000004  30  0  500  0.90 
0.000004  30  0  475  0.68 
0.000004  50  10  500  0.87 
0.000004  50  10  475  0.79 
0.000004  50  0  500  0.90 
0.000004  50  0  475  0.82 
 
                                                 
1 Changing the current futures price while leaving expected market price and expected settlement price constant 
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Figure 3. Optimal hedging ratio when current futures price differs from the expected 
settlement price (500 c/kg), for different levels of absolute risk aversion (ARA). 
 
From Equation (5), if transaction costs are zero, basis risk is zero, price expectations 
are unbiased and other parameters take the base case values from Table 2, the optimal 
hedging ratio is 100 per cent, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion. Introducing basis 
risk (rfp = 0.9) and transation costs (t = 10 c kg
-1) moves the point where the optimal hedging 
ratios are insensitive to risk aversion to 90 per cent hedging, at a price expectation of 510 c 
kg
-1, as shown in Figure 3.  
Table 4 illustrates the sensitivity of the optimal hedge to changes in marginal input 
cost, the correlation between quantity and prices, the variance of quantity produced, and the 
correlation between the cash price and the settlement futures price (negatively related to basis 
risk). Again, other parameters are at the base-case levels shown in Table 2. Of these 
parameters, only basis risk makes a noticeable difference to the optimal hedge. The others 
only affect hedging at all when production is risky and correlated with prices, and the 
marginal cost is not equal to the expected sale price (i.e. when the producer is not operating 
close to the optimal level of production output), and even then, the effect is small. 
To assess the overall sensitivity of optimal hedging to each of the varied parameters, a 
complete factorial experiment was conducted using all combinations of parameter levels 
shown in Table 2. Then for each parameter, we calculated a sensitivity index, equal to the 
absolute value of the change in h* averaged across all combinations of the other parameter 
levels. In Table 5 the parameters are ranked according to their sensitivity index value. 
Reinforcing the results in Tables 3 and 4, the parameters with the greatest impact on optimal 
hedging are price expectations, risk aversion, price risk and transaction costs.  
It is noteworthy that price expectations are highly ranked in Table 5, particularly in 
view of their relative neglect in many studies. Often it is assumed that producers’ price 
expectations coincide with the futures price. Figure 2 illustrates that this assumption is likely 
to be incorrect for many, if not most, farmers, and the results above show that the assumption 
can alter hedging results greatly, especially for farmers who have low to moderate levels of 
risk aversion.  
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Table 4. Optimal hedging ratio for various parameter combinations (other parameters at base 
case values) 
Cv’(q)  rfq = rpq  sq  rfp  h* ratio 
500  -0.1  1000  0.9  0.55 
500  -0.1  1000  1  0.65 
500  -0.1  0  0.9  0.55 
500  -0.1  0  1  0.65 
500  0  1000  0.9  0.55 
500  0  1000  1  0.65 
500  0  0  0.9  0.55 
500  0  0  1  0.65 
400  -0.1  1000  0.9  0.54 
400  -0.1  1000  1  0.64 
400  -0.1  0  0.9  0.55 
400  -0.1  0  1  0.65 
400  0  1000  0.9  0.55 
400  0  1000  1  0.65 
400  0  0  0.9  0.55 
400  0  0  1  0.65 
 
The sensitivity of results to price expectations reveals that the speculative component 
of decisions about futures contracts is comparable in importance to the hedging component, 
and potentially more important for farmers of low to moderate risk aversion. Combined with 
the influence of transaction costs, this provides a strong potential explanation for low use of 
futures by some farmers. If they perceive that current futures prices are pessimistic (i.e. likely 
to be lower than the settlement price will be), they have a motivation to reduce the level of 
hedging selected. Indeed, for the model with all base-case parameter values apart from a 
pessimistic futures price (second line of Table 3), the optimal hedging ratio is negative, 
indicating that it would be optimal for the producer to take a long position in the futures 
market – buying rather than selling contracts. 
 
Table 5. Ranking of model parameters according to sensitivity index 
Parameter  Sensitivity index 
0 f   0.37 
l  0.31 
sf = sp  0.24 
t  0.15 
rfp  0.10 
Cv’(q)  0.002 
rfq = rpq  0.002 
sq  0.002 
 
Another potential explanation proposed earlier is that the benefits of hedging are not 
large enough to motivate farmers to participate. This may be especially relevant to farmers 
who are not already experienced in the operations of the futures market, given the learning 
costs that they would need to bear in order to participate. Table 6 shows the percentage gain 
in welfare (measured as certainty equivalent) as a result of switching from zero hedging to 
the optimal level of hedging. Results are shown for combinations of the four parameters to 
which hedging is most sensitive (Table 5).    11 
 
Table 6.  Percentage gain in welfare (certainty equivalent) from hedging optimally relative to 
zero hedging 
l  sf = sp  t  0 f   CE increase from hedging (%) 
0.000001  30  10  500  2.3 
0.000001  30  10  475  0.7 
0.000001  30  0  500  6.0 
0.000001  30  0  475  0.0 
0.000001  50  10  500  14.2 
0.000001  50  10  475  5.1 
0.000001  50  0  500  19.1 
0.000001  50  0  475  8.2 
0.000004  30  10  500  25.1 
0.000004  30  10  475  13.5 
0.000004  30  0  500  30.7 
0.000004  30  0  475  17.7 
0.000004  50  10  500  245 
0.000004  50  10  475  203 
0.000004  50  0  500  263 
0.000004  50  0  475  219 
 
For the highly risk-averse farmer, if price uncertainty is high, the percentage gains 
from hedging can be very high (over 200 per cent increase in CE in this example). On the 
other hand, if the farmer has only a moderate degree of risk aversion, and moderate price 
uncertainty, the gains from hedging can be very small indeed. Results suggest that less risk-
averse farmers may have little to gain by hedging, and so little motivation to bear the 
associated learning costs.  
The explanation is that the payoff function (certainty equivalent) is flat (cf Pannell 
2006). Figure 4 shows certainty equivalent as a function of hedging ratio for the base-case 
assumptions for standard and high levels of risk aversion (corresponding to the first and ninth 
lines of results in Table 6). Clearly, there is little to be gained from hedging by farmers who 
correspond to the base case. The certainty equivalent at the optimal hedge (56 per cent) is 
only very slightly higher than for zero hedging. For the case of high risk aversion, the gain 
from hedging is more pronounced: a 25 per cent increase at 81 per cent hedging compared to 
zero hedging. Given that the majority of farmers are not highly risk averse, perhaps the 
observed low usage of hedging instruments simply reflects a realistic assessment that there is 
too little to be gained. Anxiety over the pressures resulting from participation in the futures 
market (Buschena and Zilberman, 1994) or subjective uncertainty about the operation of the 
market may outweigh the potential gains illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 6, particularly if the 
farmers lack experience with the market.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
We believe that the limited use of futures and other price hedging instruments by 
farmers in many situations is no mystery. Standard models from the literature reveal a range 
of factors that are likely to contribute to this outcome.  
The first group of factors consists of variables within the model. For example, it is 
well known that basis risk, transaction costs, and uncertainty about production cause the 
optimal hedging ratio to fall. In our case study we found that the impacts of basis risk and 
transaction costs on hedging are moderate, while uncertainty about production has only a   12 
minor influence. Lower price uncertainty also reduces the optimal hedge and may contribute 









































Figure 4. For farmers who have low to moderate risk aversion (ARA = 1.0E-06) and unbiased 
price expectations, certainty equivalent is unresponsive to the level of hedging selected. 
(Other parameters at base case levels – Table 2). 
 
A different contributing cause of low hedging was proposed by Simmons (2002): the 
ability of farmers to manage their risk exposure by adjusting leverage. He concluded that 
with a fully efficient capital market, adjustment of leverage can fully supplant the use of 
hedging instruments. There may also be other risk management strategies that farmers prefer 
to use in place of hedging, such as diversification.  
Thirdly, the use of hedging instruments has impacts beyond the reduction of price 
risk, which is the main focus of economic research in the area. If a farmer’s expectations 
about cash price deviate from the futures price on offer, purchase of a futures contract will 
alter the farmer’s expected profit, and this may have an influence on the optimal hedging 
ratio. While this has been recognized by a small number of authors, its influence on optimal 
hedging decisions has perhaps been under-recognised. Particularly for farmers who are not 
highly risk-averse, “biased” price expectations can have a major impact on the optimal hedge. 
If a farmer has optimistic price expectations relative to the futures market, the incentive to 
hedge can be greatly reduced. We cited empirical evidence illustrating the wide diversity of 
price expectation among one relatively homogeneous population of farmers.  
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, unless a farmer is highly risk-averse, the gain 
in utility from the use of futures contracts is likely to be small, perhaps very small. If the 
farmer has to bear learning costs due to inexperience with the futures market, or is 
uncomfortable or anxious about hedging, the benefits of hedging may well be insufficient to 
justify the effort.  
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